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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents seek a rehearing in this matter, fol-
lowing filing of the Court's Opinion of January 14, 1981, 
reversing a judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County that an annexation Policy Declaration of the appellant 
Town was not in compliance with the Utah Municipal Code 
relating to annexation, § 10-2-401 et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) (Supp. 1979), and was therefore ineffective to 
restrain development of plaintiffs' property under 
§ 10-2-418~ that in the circumstances the Town's attempt to 
restrain development of plaintiffs' property constituted an 
unconstitutional taking of property and an improper inter-
ference with vested rights in Salt Lake County approvals and 
permits then issued, and restraining the Town from further 
interference with development of plaintiffs' property. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Court, by Opinion filed January 14, 1981, 
reversed the decision of the District Court as described 
above. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has enacted an annexation "Policy Decla-
ration" regarding property belonging to respondents. The 
stated purpose of the Policy Declaration is to halt develop-
ment permitted on the property by Salt Lake County. 
The District Court found the Policy Declaration 
deficient for numerous reasons ranging from failure to 
notify, solicit comments from, and provide an opportunity to 
_,_ 
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protest to Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County Service Area 
#3 as "affected entities," to failure to include required 
subject matters, such as an estimate of tax consequences to 
residents, and failure to provide any meaningful analysis of 
required subject matters, such as need of the area to be 
annexed for services and ability of the Town to provide them. 
The District Court refused to accord the Policy Declaration 
the affect claimed by the Town of forbidding development of 
plaintiffs' property. 
The District Court further found that plaintiffs' 
rights in County approvals and permits then in hand was 
vested and could not be interferred with by the Town, by the 
enactment of a Policy Declaration or otherwise, and that, 
insofar as the Policy Declaration states an intent to 
permanently and entirely forbid development of plaintiffs' 
property its enforcement would constitute an unconstitutional 
taking of property. 
This Court reversed upon the grounds: 
1. That the state's new annexation law authorizes 
annexation without a petition from landowners, or against 
their wishes; 
2. That only Salt Lake County was an "affected 
entity" having a right to notice, comment and protest in this 
case; 
3. That an undefined "substantial compliance" test 
is applicable to annexation Policy Declarations; 
_,_ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. That the Policy Declaration in this case does 
not take plaintiffs' property; and 
5. That the issue of interference with vested 
rights is not ripe. 
ARGUMENT 
The Opinion of the Court filed January 14, 1981, is 
erroneous for numerous reasons: 
1. It mistakenly holds, in contradiction to the 
plain language of the statute, that the new annexation law is 
intended to provide municipalities power to annex without the 
consent of landowners. This error involves a misconception 
of the entire purpose of the new statute and of the interests 
it is designed to protect. 
2. It effectively limits the right to be notified, 
to comment, and to protest in annexation proceedings to 
counties, thus eliminating the great majority of entities 
intended by the Legislature to participate in annexation 
proceedings, and rendering the Legislature's new Boundary 
Commission scheme largely useless. 
3. It applies an outmoded standard of "substantial 
compliance" to Policy Declarations, together with the rule 
created under the State's old law that municipal annexation 
decisions are subject only to municipal discretion, thus 
defeating the basic purpose of the new annexation law to make 
municipal annexation decisions accountable, through a process 
of notice, disclosure, protest, and review by Boundary 
-3-
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Commissions, to protect the interests of counties, other 
municipalities, local service entities, and landowners. 
4. It affectively holds that annexation proceed-
ings may be used by a municipality to force a landowner to 
relinquish vested property rights. 
Point I. The New Annexation Law Specifically 
Forbids Annexation Without The Consent Of Landowners. 
The Court's Opinion of January 14, at pages 3 and 
4, recites that the former annexation law required a petition 
of landowners to initiate annexation, and then holds that 
this requirement has been eliminated in the new law, that 
municipalities may annex without the consent, or against the 
wishes, of landowners by passing a Policy Declaration which, 
if not protested by an "affected entity", can be promptly 
followed by an annexation ordinance. 
This holding is simply mistaken, and the error 
affects the entire opinion, including the result. 
The requirement of a petition from landowners has 
not been eliminated in the new law. Municipalities may not 
proceed without one. Section 10-2-416, U.C.A. (1953) (Supp. 
1979), entirely ignored by the Court's Opinion, describes the 
petition in language identical to the old statute, adding the 
following prohibition: 
"Except as provided for in Section 
10-2-420, no annexation may be initiated 
except by a petition filed pursuant to the 
requirements set forth herein." 
-4-
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The Opinion here is directly contrary to the legislation, 
and on this ground alone cannot be allowed to stand. 
It is true, of course, that a municipality may 
create a policy declaration before receiving a petition to 
annex. § 10-2-414. The fact emphasizes the function of the 
policy declaration as an advance planning tool, rather than a 
mere formality initiating annexation. It is also true that 
§ 10-2-415 provides next that: 
If: (1) an annexation proposed in the 
policy declaration, in the judgment of the 
municipality, meets the standards set forth in 
this chapter: and (2) no protest has been 
filed by written application by an affected 
entity within five days following the public 
hearing, the members of the governing body may 
by two-thirds vote adopt a resolution or 
ordinance of annexation ••• 
This hardly eliminates the requirement of a petition to 
annex as one of the standards set forth in the chapter. For 
those standards, the municipality must, as the Court did not, 
read beyond § 10-2-415 at least to §§ 10-2-416 and 10-2-417. 
It is also apparently true that the new annexation 
law, as proposed in the House of Representatives, intended to 
have the affect recited by the Court's Opinion. The legisla-
tion passed the House in essentially the form in which it 
presently appears. The Senate, however, added two important 
provisions: (1) the last sentence of § 10-2-416, and (2) and 
the middle porton of § 10-2-418, reading: 
••• provided, however, that a property 
owner desiring to develop or improve property 
within the said one-half mile area may notify 
the municipality in writing of said desire and 
identify with particularity all legal and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
factual barriers preventing an annexation to 
the municipality. At the end of 12 
consecutive months from the filing with the 
municipality of said notice and after a good 
faith and diligent effort by said property 
owner to annex, said property owner may 
develop as otherwise permitted by law. 
Vol. 2, 1979 Senate Journal, pp. 1365-66. 
In the form enacted, the legislation does not alter, but 
reaffirms the Legislature's historic concern to protect the 
interests of private owners. 
The legislative history demonstrates two points of 
vital importance. The new annexation law, as proposed, gave 
municipalities the power to annex on their own initiative. 
The Legislature did not concede this power without restric-
tions, however. For the restraining hand of the landowner, 
the Legislature substituted the restraining hand of the 
boundary commission. In respect of the new power to be 
granted, the Legislature created an elaborate system by which 
municipal annexation proposals are subjected to notice and 
disclosure to counties, other municipalities, local service 
entities, and landowners, and ultimate review by newly 
created boundary commissions. It is simply not correct, as 
the Court's Opinion of January 14, does, to apply to the new 
annexation law the rule created under the old annexation law 
that annexation decisions are wholly a matter of municipal 
prerogative. The new legislation, even in its initial form, 
plainly changed that rule. The error of the Opinion in this 
regard is plainly demonstrated by its pointed omission, in 
-6-
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quoting the legislative policy set out in S 10-2-401, of 
subsections (6) and, (7). Those provide: 
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal 
boundaries and urban development need to be 
made with adequate consideration of the effect 
of the proposed actions on adjacent areas and on 
the interests of other government entities, on 
the need for and cost of local government 
services and the ability to deliver the 
services under the proposed actions, and on 
factors related to population growth and 
density and the geography of the area; 
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries 
are of concern to citizens in all parts of the 
state and must therefore be considered a state 
responsibility. 
The matter of annexation is not a matter of 
merely municipal concern and discretion, as the Opinion 
holds, it is a matter of State concern, as the statute 
declares, and the State's concerns are implemented by the 
boundary commission review process, of which the Opinion of 
January 14 so cavalierly disposes. 
The Legislature then put back into the law, before 
passage, the requirement of landowner consent. This did not 
alter the scheme of disclosure and review created by the 
Legislature. It added to it. In final form the new annexa-
tion law has two fundamental features: it subjects municipal 
annexation decisions to disclosure and review and it pre-
serves the right of landowners to consent to or dissent from 
annexation. 
The Court's Opinion of January 14 demolishes both 
fundamental features of the new annexation law. It not only 
-7-
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erases the requirement of landowner consent, but, by elimi-
nating virtually all of the entities intended by the Legisla-
ture to have disclosure and the right to initiate review, and 
by reducing the required Policy Declaration to a mere pro 
forma listing of topics, it eviscerates the boundary commis-
sion review process. 
It also ignores the connection between the duty of 
the municipality to make full and fair disclosure to, and 
solicit the participation of appropriate entities, and the 
right of landowners to give or withhold consent. Landowners 
must also be notified of the proceedings and allowed to 
participate. § 10-2-414. Some of the matters required to be 
included in the policy declaration are obviously intended to 
benefit landowners - such as the disclosure of tax conse-
quences so paintedly omitted by Alta in this case. The 
purpose is plain and landowners have a right to full and fair 
disclosure so that they may make an informed choice whether 
to consent or refuse, and whether to enlist the aid of a 
county or local entity in seeking Boundary Commission review. 
The Opinion of January 14 simply erases the right of land-
owners by eliminating the procedures so carefully contracted 
by the Legislature to protect it. 
Point II. Local Service Entities And 
Municipalities Are "Affected Entities" Having A. Right To 
Disclosure And To Protest Under The New Law. 
The Opinion of January 14 holds that Salt Lake 
County Service Area i3, admittedly directly affected in ter-
-~- r 
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ritor~, service delivery and revenues by Alta's proposed 
annexation of plaintiffs' property, and admittedly not noti-
fied and given opportunity to participate in the annexation 
proceedings, was not an "affected entity" entitled to such 
consideration, upon the facile ground that, while service 
areas have the power to levy taxes, such taxes are actually 
collected for them by the counties. 
Section 10-2-414, setting out the requirements for 
a policy declaration, provides that a declaration may be 
adopted only "after requesting comments from county govern-
ment, other affected entities within the area and the local 
boundary commission." Required public hearings on a declara-
tion may be held only after 20 days written notice and 
delivery of a copy of the proposed declaration to each 
affected entity and the local boundary commission. 
Section 10-1-104(8) provides: 
"Affected entities" means a county, 
municipality or other entity possessing taxing 
power within a county, whose territory, 
service, delivery or revenue will be directly 
and significantly affected by a proposed 
boundary change •. 
There are numerous entities within counties 
which have territory and revenue, deliver services, and levy 
taxes. One might name, in addition to County Service Areas, 
improvement districts, water, sewer, and fire districts, mos-
quite abatement districts, school districts, and numerous 
others. The Court eliminates all of them as "affected 
entities" for a single reason nowhere mentioned in the 
_q_ 
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annexation law: all certify their levies to the county, which 
collects their taxes for them. 
If this were a basis for elimination from the 
category of "affected entities", it is plain that munici-
palities would also be eliminated, since they also certify 
their levies to the counties, which collect their taxes. 
§ 10-6-134, 59-9-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
The definition of "affected entities" specifically 
mentions "municipalit(ies) or other entit(ies) possessing 
taxing power within a county." The kind of entities 
mentioned above, including service areas, possess the same 
taxing power as municipalities: they levy taxes, which the 
counties collect for them. Indeed, if the fact that the 
county collects the tax levied is a disqualification, there 
are no "other entities having taxing power - - - territory, 
service delivery or revenue." All of such service entities 
in this state have the taxes they levy collected for them by 
the counties. 
The Court's Opinion simply eliminates the category 
of "other entities" created by the Legislature - on the basis 
of the tax collecting distinction nowhere mentioned in the 
statute. Certainly there is no such distinction indicated in 
the legislature purpose that: 
Decisions with respect to municipal 
boundaries and urban development need to be 
made with adequate consideration of the effect 
of the proposed actions on adjacent areas and on 
the interests of other government entities, on 
the need for and cost of local government 
services and the ability to deliver the 
, " 
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services under the proposed actions, and on 
factors related to population growth and 
density and the geography of the area. 
Certainly no such purpose can be accomplished where all 
local service entities are eliminated from consideration and 
participation in the annexation process. 
The Legislature, in defining "affected entities" 
and protecting their interests, did not intend the tax col-
lecting distinction created by the Court out of thin air. 
The Opinion does not dispute the findings of the 
District Court that Salt Lake City's service delivery and 
revenues will be directly and subtantially affected by Alta's 
proposed annexation because the annexation admittedly cannot 
occur without one of Salt Lake City's water rights. The 
Opinion nevertheless finds that "there is nothing in the 
record to show that Salt Lake City would be directly or 
significantly affected by a proposed boundary change •• " 
If this is intended to·indicate that a municipality is not an 
"affected entity" unless its territory is affected by a pro-
posed boundary change, it is plainly erroneous. If another 
municipality's territory is affected, annexation is 
forbidden. § 10-2-417(c). The Legislature cannot be thought 
to have intended that municipalities are only entitled to 
disclosure and the right to protest where the annexation is 
forbidden in any case. 
Taken at face value, the practical affect of the 
Court's Opinion of January 14 is to eliminate disclosure to, 
or protest by any entities but counties. 
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Salt Lake County Service Area #3 and Salt Lake City 
were affected entities in this case. They were not notified, 
their comments were not sought, their right to protest (as 
the Service Area has indicated it would have done) was 
denied. The failure defeats the purpose of the statute in 
this case, and the Court's unfounded justification of the 
failure defeats the purpose of the statute entirely. 
(The additional comments of the Opinion that 
"representatives of the Service Area 13 were in attendance at 
both the public meetings • • • and were fully apprised of the 
contents of the policy declaration and the considerations 
made and discussed" are not all false and in plain contradic-
tion to the uncontroverted findings of the District Court -
that an employee (singular} of the Service Area was present 
in a .!!2.£-representational capacity - they are immaterial. 
Affected entities are entitled to written notice in advance 
to their entire "governing body", with a right to comment and 
protest.) 
Point III. The Question Of Vested Rights Is Ripe. 
The Opinion of January 14 holds that the question 
of plaintiffs' vested rights in present County approvals and 
permits is not yet ripe for decision. The Opinion further 
holds that where there are "legal and factual barriers" to a 
proposed annexation, adoption of the policy declaration 
initiates a year period under § 10-2-418 in which there 
should be "a good faith and diligent effort to work out those 
legal and factual barriers by both the municipality and the 
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developing property owner to accomplish the annexation in 
accordance with the legislative policies." 
If the Opinion is correct that municipalities can 
annex without the consent of landowners, then the Opinion 
cannot be correct in its reading of § 10-2-418. If the 
municipality can annex without consent, then it can annex 
regardless of whether the landowner believes there are 
barriers to annexation and wishes to discuss them. No good 
faith effort to get annexed is necessary on the part of the 
owner - the municipality can annex whether or not the owner 
makes an effort, good faith or otherwise. 
Furthermore, "legal and factual barriers" to 
annexation conceivable within the Court's ruling that munici-
palities can annex without landowner's consent cannot be 
"worked out" by any amount of "good faith and diligent 
effort" between the landowner and the annexing municipality. 
The only legal and factual barriers of this kind are those 
listed in§ 10-2-417, and these are simply non-negotiable. 
No effort on the part of the landowner and annexing munici-
pality, however diligent, can alter the fact that the terri-
tory is non-contiguous, or already incorporated within 
another municipality, for example. 
As a practical matter, the only legal and factual 
barrier to annexation to which § 10-2-418 can apply is the 
barrier created by the refusal of owners to consent, the 
right preserved to them by the last sentence of § 10-2-416. 
As a practical matter, consent is the subject which the Court 
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now remits plaintiffs to negotiate with Alta. As a practical 
matter, the situation imposed by the Court upon plaintiffs is 
insupportable: unless plaintiffs consent, Alta will continue 
to claim, as it has steadfastly claimed until now, that 
plaintiffs have not shown good faith, and that the year 
limitation never runs. 
The conditions upon which Alta proposes annexation 
~ 
are plainly stated on the face of its Policy Declaration. It 
will not annex unless plaintiffs acknowledge that present 
permits and approvals from Salt Lake County need not be 
honored by the Town. 
As a practical matter, the Court has ordered 
plaintiffs to negotiate with Alta the surrender of 
plaintiffs' vested rights in existing County permits and 
approvals in order to lift the present wholesale prohibition 
against development of plaintiffs' property. 
The question of vested rights could hardly be more 
ripe. Plaintiffs must continue in an absolute prohibition 
of development, which violates their vested rights, or they 
must surrender their vested rights. 
·rt is no assistance in this situation for the Court 
to suggest that Alta may yet choose to amend its Policy 
Declaration. Where there is a present violation of presently 
vested rights, the matter is not one which can be left to the 
possibility of future choice. 
Further, to the extent that the vested rights 
recognized by this State's law in development permits are 
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property rights, it is plain that the affect of Alta's Policy 
Declaration is a taking of property. 
This is true whether one concedes that the taking 
is permanent as argued above, or only temporary, as the 
Opinion seems to concede. The Opinion holds that "the fact 
that the policy declaration may create some delay in urban 
development or hardship or even financial loss must give way 
to the needs of the public for orderly growth and development 
and for the protection of the public health, safety, and 
welfare. No doubt, but where the rights are presently 
vested, even interference upon the ground of public health, 
safety and welfare must be paid for. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Opinion of January 14 incorrectly concludes 
that the Utah's new annexation law authorizes annexation 
without landowner consent. It compounds that error by 
attempting to apply to the new law the rule under the old law 
that annexation is a matter of almost unqualified municipal 
discretion. The Legislature, in creating the new law 
discarded that notion, and replaced it with a system of 
disclosure and review designed to subject municipal decisions 
to proper consideration of the interest of counties, other 
municipalities, local service entities, and landowners in 
recognition of the fact that growth is a matter of state, not 
simply municipal concern. 
The Opinion of January 14 wholly misconceives the 
new annexation law. It aborts the work of the Legislature 
-1~-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and imposes an improper and unjust result upon plaintiffs~ 
The Opinion of January 14 may not be allowed to stand. This 
matter must be 
DATED 
reheard. this..?'~aay of~, 1981. 
Respe~~~-kubmitted, 
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